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between persons on very unequal footings. It is true that legal security and political stability are essential to social welfare; but the greatest enemies of security and stability are those who resist every change in institutions, while such changes can still be made by legal and constitutional means. Some may think that the Duke of Argyll is damaging the case of the conscientious and public-spirited and intelligent land-owners, such as he himself claims to be (pp. 413, 439), by refusing to make any distinction between them and those whose "rent" represents no social service whatsoever, unless to have taken the trouble to be born or to have gambled successfully in land-values be considered a social service in some systems of ethics. By such a line of argument the duke can please nobody, except the most bigoted supporter of the *status quo* and its most extreme and intemperate assailants.

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FRIEDRICH ALBERT LANGE; a Biography. By O. A. Ellisen. With the portrait of F. A. Lange. Leipzig: Julius Bădecker, 1891. Pp. 271.

It is a difficult task which the author of this book has undertaken, and he will not easily satisfy his readers either in Germany or in Europe at large. One is tempted to exclaim, Would that the man himself whom this book is designed to portray could be recalled to life! He was a man characterized by abounding vitality, responding sensitively to external circumstances, yet ever following the continuity of his inner life while making the most heterogeneous interests his own, and solving the most difficult problems. This man has, alas, been gone from us a long time, and for a long time to come will he be missed. Well for us if he is indeed missed, at least here and there among the few. The nature and influence of such a man no book can adequately describe. Nor can any mere biography hope to compensate for the loss of so noble a personality, whose qualities of mind and heart are so sadly missed in these present times. Such compensation can be eventually rendered only by a kindred personality, to whose advent we may look forward, who shall extend the hand of spirit to that earnest German fighter of the days before the war. Would we therefore do justice to the present volume, we must moderate those expectations which the unrest of the age and grief and indignation are calculated to

engender in the breasts of those who sympathize with Lange's idealism.

The merit of this book consists, above all, in the fact that a young German holding, as Lange once did, the position of teacher in a gymnasium, should have so keenly felt the absence of a literary monument to Lange's memory as to resolve to cancel the national debt of gratitude so far as his own ability might avail. And who would be disposed to think less of our author because he was, above all, attracted to his task by the love which the versatile, philosophic nature of his hero inspired in him; more especially as this love with him is not a mere matter of caprice or blind enthusiasm, but rather leads him to pursue his subject through all the intricacies of a many-sided career, to penetrate to a clear comprehension of the underlying motives, and to shed on these motives the light of a discriminating criticism. It is possible, indeed, that the author would have better succeeded in impressing the critics if he had expressed himself with less reserve, and had taken occasion to make a formidable display of his own attainments in the field of philosophy and economics, though well-informed readers cannot fail to perceive that he is more than versed in these subjects, that, in fact, he has mastered the main points. This, however, is a question of taste; and, if I mistake not, the author will bear with equanimity the censure which he has incurred on such grounds. And certainly, censure of this sort cannot affect in the least the intrinsic merit of the book.

According to Goethe, the first requirement which a biographer should fulfil is that of loving self-surrender toward his subject, a desire to catch the impression as a whole of the personality which he describes. Let progressive investigation, thereafter, discover and impartially present any defect or weakness that may exist. To this requirement the author has conformed, and the writer of these lines would thank him warmly for the spirit in which he has undertaken his task, for the token he has given of genuine love toward an epigone of our German idealists. Yes, I would thank him in the name of those, few as perhaps they may be, who will esteem it a happy and auspicious event in German literature that the life of our Albert Lange has been held up as a mirror and as a warning to this confused age of ours. Others, too, who, engrossed with the function of criticism, have hardly expressed their recognition of the author's labors sufficiently, may, at heart, be willing to add their thanks to ours. At all events, one cannot help uttering the

wish that, among our rising generation, there might be many whose enthusiasm should take the same direction as his, and whose intellectual orientation might be equally clear and well defined. It is this clear and definite orientation that deserves to be especially signalized. Considering the sort of criticism to which Lange's position is still subjected, the author might easily have been betrayed into diverting criticism from Lange by exposing the weak points in the attacks of his opponents. To this temptation, however, he is far from yielding. He does not attempt to conceal the faults of Lange's principal work, while, at the same time, he indicates how, in his opinion, these faults may be corrected in harmony with Lange's own tendency and ideas. These suggestions themselves, it is true, reveal the ascendancy which the man whose thought he studies has acquired over the mind of his biographer.

The writer of this review may lay claim to an indefectible distinction, inasmuch as he has been favored by the author of the "History of Materialism" with the friendliest recognition, and has enjoyed with him a close intercourse in which the effort to achieve a complete understanding on matters of principle was continued almost to the last moment of Lange's life. All the more on this account he feels called upon not to let this opportunity pass without saying, not thereby detracting in the least from a deep sense of personal gratitude toward the departed friend, what should be said in the interest of impartial truth.

The study of Lange's career is chiefly profitable because it challenges us to survey and consider the entire modern situation. On all sides there are burning questions of theory and practical needs of great magnitude. So far as the field of political economy is concerned there is no lack of attempts to grapple with these problems and needs. Not only new compends, but new works on the principles of this science are incessantly appearing. In the domain of jurisprudence, philosophical velleities, sometimes even taking the form of irresponsible dilettanteism, show themselves, not only in the department of criminal law, which from of old has been in touch with philosophic theories, but even in the more positivist branch of the Romanistic studies. And yet, in this age of many books, hardly does such a thing as a philosophy of law venture to the surface. It is, then, believed possible to discuss the foundations of economics and of the science of law independently of a systematic philosophy of law! In the realm of social conflicts we

find a similar state of things. Religion, again, everywhere and in all denominations has become an *ecclesia militans*, while between political parties and scientific sects a warfare is being carried on no less bitter than that between the religions and the creeds. The differences about which all these conflicts turn are confessedly located and rooted in the philosophic problems. And yet, here, too, the incredible occurs,—namely, that neither in name (the avoidance of the name might possibly be explained) nor in fact is an attempt made to build up a systematic philosophy of religion. And the cause of this defect is in all cases the same. Courage seems to be wanting to reconstruct ethics which itself can arise only at the centre of a philosophical system.

Now, this faulty method of dealing with philosophical questions which is characteristic of our age was shared by Lange. To this defect we must ascribe, it is true, the varied and effective impulses which he imparted in so many directions. But to the same cause, also, it is due that the penetrating eye will gradually see the shadows deepen in the bright picture of Lange's thought. As a critic and essayist in the grand style he sharply defined his attitude toward the chief social problems,—the problems of economics and religion. But he had in view neither a philosophy of law nor an ethical system which might absorb the essential questions of those practical sciences.

With this want of systematic purpose in the plan of his principal work is connected, furthermore, his failure adequately to grasp and expound the leading philosophical principle of which he treats. The fundamental concept of all philosophy and of all science is that of the *a priori*. He does not do full justice to this either on its deductive side nor yet—it is not too much to say—on its inductive side. He does not conceive of the *a priori* as of a hypothesis and presupposition which consciously and experimentally must be made the basis of all scientific work in the theoretic sciences (mathematics and the natural sciences) as well as in the ethical or intellectual sciences (*Geistes Wissenschaften*), in the interest of methodical and fruitful research. And because this Platonic conception of the ideal hypothesis escapes him, the *a priori*, much as he favors and defends it, does not in his way of thinking advance beyond the preliminary stage, to be explained as far as possible as an innate propensity, an accident of our mental constitution. It is for this reason that he fell into the snare of Darwinism, which, it is true, has rendered invaluable service in the

exploration of the animal kingdom, but whose teachings, so far as human beings are concerned, and things spiritual and moral, can be safely used only with a polemic intent, while they may even become harmful when applied positively. Suffice it, in this connection to mention Malthus, the predecessor of Darwin, in whose writings the ethical blasphemy of the theory of natural selection is plainly enough exposed to view. Lange, in his desire to learn, in his willingness to be taught, was too pliable by far, and in all these modern problems sacrificed his own self because he lacked a firm grasp on a system. He rejoiced that the theory he held in regard to human happiness, as over against the superficial, dull, conservative attitude of contentment with things as they are, seemed to be supported by doctrines resting apparently on the sure basis of natural science. I refer to the general doctrine of the development of living beings as at once purposeless and purposeful, and likewise to the doctrine of psycho-physics, which plumes itself on its supposed purely experimental origin, and yet cannot obliterate the traces of its metaphysical parentage, traces which Lange in his humility overlooked.

And it is by the same considerations alone that we can obtain an objective explanation of his personal attitude toward religion, and especially toward Christianity. In the numberless germs that are rejected by natural selection, he finds the cause of that consciousness of misery which he desires to explain and to alleviate, and of all the pain and grief which he wishes to heal. And hence it is that in Nature, that great model breeding institution, the bells may never become entirely silent that toll forth the story of human woe.

Ethics, however, never turns its face backward toward a state of Nature such as is represented by the supposed a-prioristic germs, and which is, after all, only a metaphysical figment. Forward and upward it points unwaveringly to the eternal and inexhaustible future represented by our moral tasks, to which we may never admit limitation of any kind on the ground of what are styled natural germs. Between these natural germs and the idea of the moral tasks which civilized human beings set themselves no conceivable connection is possible, and even the search for such a connection is a methodical dereliction. Social idealism, in its present clarified state, rejects, on principle, all such attempts at explanation and illustration on naturalistic grounds. As a forward impelling force, or at least as a critical motive, the ethical *a priori* has penetrated

this idealism, though consciousness of its influence may still be wanting in many instances. Proof of this fact is the severe criticism which the "*Neue Zeit*" has passed on the book we are reviewing, and which, we may add in passing, has been chiefly provocative of the remarks to the contrary that have here been expressed.

Let the memory of Lange not be effaced nor blurred among the workmen of all nations. As a thinker and champion of the right, he was distinguished by the cosmopolitan spirit so characteristic of the Germans, and gave a new impulse to the study of moral philosophy and of the principles of the natural sciences, bringing to bear upon his task an extraordinary receptivity, and embracing the chief branches of culture in an extensive scheme of historical investigation and characterization. In the social conflicts of to-day, however, even if the scientific formulas have not yet been sufficiently perfected, the issues at stake are becoming more and more definitely crystallized, and the chief desideratum now is no longer to shed the light of historic criticism upon the problems before us, but to grasp them firmly with the help of a dogmatic system, and thus to pave the way for their actual solution in the political arena. Nevertheless, in all practical movements the function of control will not be able to be dispensed with, and it is on the possession of historic insight that the just exercise of that function depends. Respect and love, therefore, are due to the man who, in his "*History of Materialism*," has deciphered the idealistic motives in universal history.

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REPORT ON THE RECENT LITERATURE OF ETHICS AND
RELATED TOPICS IN AMERICA.

1. THE MEANING AND THE METHOD OF LIFE. A SEARCH FOR RELIGION IN BIOLOGY. By George M. Gould, A.M., M.D. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1893. Pp. 297.
2. A REVIEW OF THE SYSTEMS OF ETHICS FOUNDED ON THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION. By C. M. Williams. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Pp. xv., 581.
3. FIRST STEPS IN PHILOSOPHY (PHYSICAL AND ETHICAL). By William Mackintire Salter. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1892. Pp. 156.